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INTRODUCTION
Historically, law enforcement has worked closely with dogs to investi-
gate suspected criminal activity.1 This close relationship has evolved into
the use of drug-detection dogs to assist in narcotics investigations. Each
year, state and federal law enforcement agencies conduct many dog sniffs in
* Juris Doctor, 2019, University of St. Thomas School of Law. The views expressed are
solely the author’s and do not reflect his work as a law clerk or the views of the Minnesota
Judicial Branch. Thank you to Scott Swanson, Matthew Hough, and the University of St. Thomas
Law Journal for your assistance in preparing this comment.
1. Charles F. Sloane, Dogs in War, Police Work and on Patrol, 46 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 385, 388–89 (1955–56); see also Irus Braverman, Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs as
Surveillance Technology, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 81, 124–28 (2013) (discussing humans’ use of dogs in
warfare and as law enforcement partners).
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search of illegal drugs.2 The longstanding pairing of law enforcement and
their loyal canines has changed policing throughout the United States.3 As
the decriminalization of certain drug offenses garners increased national at-
tention, the utility of this police practice will come under greater scrutiny.
In State v. Edstrom,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the pro-
priety of a warrantless dog sniff of an apartment door in a common hallway
of a secured residential building. Considering the question in the wake of
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines,5 a di-
vided Supreme Court declined to grant tenants either a property right or
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area immediately next to their
apartment door.6 The court’s reasoning has important implications for te-
nants, criminal lawyers, and law enforcement actors.
This comment discusses the importance of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s Edstrom decision in the criminal procedure arena. Part I presents a
survey of relevant Minnesota dog sniff case law before Edstrom. Part II
analyzes Edstrom in detail, including the facts, procedural posture, and the
opinions of both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme
Court. Part III analyzes the Edstrom decision and discusses its importance
given current societal sentiment toward the policing of narcotics.
I. DOG-SNIFF CASE LAW IN MINNESOTA PRIOR TO EDSTROM
Before the court of appeals’ decision in Edstrom, Minnesota dog-sniff
case law lacked clarity.7 Was a dog sniff a search under either the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution? What standard—reasonable suspicion or probable
2. Brief for Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2–4, Florida v. Jardines,
569 U.S. 1 (2013) (No. 11-564), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/11-
564-Jardines_Amicus-Brief1.pdf.
3. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 131, 131 (May 9, 2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/war-on-drugs-
privacy-law.
4. 916 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (2019). One
amicus brief—from the Fourth Amendment Scholars in support of Edstrom—was filed with the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
5. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
6. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 524. Before the Jardines decision, a majority of federal courts
interpreted past Supreme Court precedent to mean that a dog sniff was never a search. See
Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 66–68 & nn.15–16 (Fla. 2011) (Polston, J., dissenting) (collecting
cases).
7. See State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that the use of a
narcotics-detection dog to sniff the exterior of motor vehicle during a traffic stop was not a search,
but required “reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity”); see also State v.
Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211–12 (Minn. 2005) (finding that a dog sniff outside of a private stor-
age unit was a search requiring reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173,
183 (Minn. 2007) (holding that police use of a drug-detection dog in the common hallway of an
apartment building was a search requiring reasonable suspicion under the Minnesota
Constitution).
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cause—did police need before using a narcotics-detection dog?8 The in-
quiry often turned on the specific area or item subjected to the dog sniff.
This case-specific analysis created confusion, as evidenced by the various
decisions before the supreme court’s decision in Edstrom. The most impor-
tant of these decisions, State v. Wiegand, State v. Carter, and State v. Davis,
are discussed immediately below. The Federal Court of Appeals circuit split
following Jardines has also complicated the issue.9
A. State v. Wiegand
The first chance for the Minnesota Supreme Court to address the level
of suspicion necessary to conduct a dog sniff occurred in the 2002 case of
State v. Wiegand. The facts of Wiegand are as follows.
At 12:20 a.m., a Cloquet police officer conducted a traffic stop on a
vehicle with a burnt-out headlight.10 The officer identified the vehicle’s oc-
cupants, and observed that Wiegand, who was driving, had slow and quiet
speech, was somewhat nervous, had glossy eyes, and appeared to be shak-
ing.11 The two vehicle occupants denied possessing drugs in the vehicle,
and the car’s owner refused a request to search the vehicle.12
After more officers arrived on scene, the stopping officer asked an-
other officer to issue a warning for an equipment violation while he re-
trieved his narcotics-detection dog.13 The stopping officer walked the dog
around the vehicle three times.14 Each time, the dog alerted to narcotics
near the vehicle’s front passenger side.15 During the search, the officer
placed the drug dog inside the vehicle to pinpoint the contraband’s exact
location.16 But the dog did not alert to narcotics inside the vehicle and a
later search within the vehicle recovered no narcotics.17 The officer han-
dling the dog then opened the vehicle’s hood and discovered a plastic bag
containing about four ounces of marijuana.18
8. See Brief for Minnesota County Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae supporting Ap-
pellant, State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018) (No. A16-1382), 2017 WL 8772617.
9. See Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches and What It
Leaves Unanswered, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1289, 1303–05 (2015) (explaining that most cases decided
before Jardines rejected the notion that residents of multidwelling buildings could claim curtilage
protection in common areas).
10. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 128.
11. Id. At the later suppression hearing, the stopping officer testified that he did not believe
Wiegand was using drugs but did believe he was acting suspiciously during the stop. Id. Addition-
ally, the stopping officer testified at the suppression hearing that Wiegand was looking down and
failed to talk in the officer’s direction when providing responses. Id.
12. Id. at 128–29.
13. Id. at 129.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The record is unclear about whether this occurred before or after the third exterior sniff.
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 129.
17. Id.
18. A pat down of Wiegand led to the recovery of additional marijuana and some cocaine. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 4 16-APR-20 15:44
300 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2
The State charged Wiegand with two counts of fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance.19 The district court granted Wiegand’s motion to
suppress and dismissed the charges, reasoning that law enforcement lacked
probable cause both to walk the drug dog around the vehicle and for the
later pat search of Wiegand’s person.20 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed, determining that because a dog sniff was not a search, police did
not need probable cause.21
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Wiegand framed the issue as
“whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Arti-
cle I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution require probable cause or a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before a
narcotics-detection dog may be used around the exterior of a motor vehicle
stopped for an equipment violation.”22 To begin answering the federal con-
stitution question, the Wiegand court fleshed out the dog-sniff decision in
United States v. Place, where the United States Supreme Court held that a
dog sniff of luggage in an airport was not a search requiring probable
cause.23 The court next acknowledged that an automobile retained some
Fourth Amendment protections but also emphasized that United States Su-
preme Court precedent afforded less protection to automobiles compared
with homes or other privacy interests.24 In holding that the dog sniff around
the motor vehicle’s exterior did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the Wiegand court relied on the United States Supreme
Court’s recent opinion in City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, which involved
police use of drug-sniffing dogs at roadside checkpoints.25 Based on Place,
19. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 152.025, subdiv. 2(1) (2000)).
20. Id.
21. State v. Wiegand, 621 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 645 N.W.2d 125
(Minn. 2002).
22. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 129. (“[W]hether the use of the narcotics-detection dog in this
case was within the permissible scope of the limited investigation occasioned by a stop for a
routine equipment violation.”).
23. Id. at 129–30 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). The Wiegand
court also examined the then recent decision of Kyllo v. United States. Id. at 130 (citing Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). In a remarkable stroke of foreshadowing, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court noted, “While Kyllo involved both the home and a piece of technical equipment
much different from a dog, its reasoning suggests that a dog sniff of a home might lead a court to
conclude that a search requiring probable cause took place.” Id. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Jardines would vindicate this line of dicta.
24. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
25. Id. (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that police
may not conduct roadblocks and use narcotics-detection dogs when the primary purpose of the
roadblocks is to detect criminal wrongdoing)). The Minnesota Supreme Court also relied on fed-
eral case law from various circuit courts of appeals which reached the same conclusion. Id. at 132
(citing United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d
192, 194 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897,
opinion amended on other grounds, 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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Edmund, and persuasive federal case law, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the dog sniff of the vehicle’s exterior was not a search requiring
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.26
The court next addressed Wiegand’s argument that the Minnesota
Constitution should be interpreted as requiring law enforcement to possess
probable cause before conducting a warrantless dog sniff outside a motor
vehicle.27 Answering in the negative, the Wiegand court noted that the deci-
sion in Place did not constitute a radical departure from prior precedents,
and more importantly, the Place analysis involved weighing the govern-
ment’s interest against the degree of intrusion against the citizen.28 In deter-
mining what level of suspicion police needed to conduct a dog sniff of a
motor vehicle’s exterior, the Wiegand court employed the Terry balancing
test to weigh the competing interests, just as the Supreme Court had done in
Place.29 While the Minnesota Supreme Court adhered to the United States
Supreme Court’s decisions in Place and United States v. Jacobsen,30 which
noted the limited intrusiveness of a dog sniff, it ultimately reasoned that the
use of a dog to sniff an automobile’s exterior involved some degree of in-
trusion into an individual’s privacy interest.
Based on this analysis, the court held that law enforcement must pos-
sess reasonable suspicion of narcotics activity before using a drug-detection
dog during a traffic stop.31 Applying the reasonable suspicion standard to
the facts of Wiegand’s appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that po-
lice lacked reasonable suspicion of drug activity to use a narcotics-detection
dog.32 Specifically, it noted that the stopping officer merely stated that Wie-
gand was acting nervously but articulated no basis to find that Wiegand was
involved in drug-related activity.33 Thus, the supreme court found that the
dog sniff of the vehicle was unlawful.34
26. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 132.
27. Id. (“We may construe a provision of the Minnesota Constitution to extend greater rights
than a comparable provision in the U.S. Constitution, but we will not do so cavalierly.”) (citing
State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999); State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn.
1999)). The court noted that it had twice interpreted Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Consti-
tution as providing greater protection for its citizens based on “sharp” or “radical departures” in
case law from the United States Supreme Court. Id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)).
28. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 132–33 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
29. Id. at 134 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968)).
30. In Jacobsen, Drug Enforcement Agents responded to an airport to examine a partially
damaged package containing several plastic baggies. 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984). A DEA agent
removed a plastic bag, took a small amount of white powder from the bag, and field tested the
substance, which he recognized as cocaine. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that no
Fourth Amendment search occurred because no expectation of privacy had been implicated. Id. at
120.
31. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 135.
32. Id. at 137.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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In a special brief concurrence, Justice Alan Page argued that the Min-
nesota Constitution should be read as affording greater protection to indi-
viduals against warrantless dog sniffs outside automobiles.35
Acknowledging contrary case law, Justice Page contended that there was no
“distinction between sense-enhancement-by-technology and sense-enhance-
ment-by-canine.”36 Justice Page believed that the majority’s approach es-
sentially gutted the procedures established in Terry by concluding that a
dog sniff is not intrusive and gives police permission to use this procedure
when less intrusive means may be available to the investigating officer.37
Justice Page would have held that police must possess probable cause of
narcotics activity before they may lawfully use a narcotics-detection dog to
sniff a vehicle.38
B. State v. Carter
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the propriety of a dog
sniff in the 2005 case of State v. Carter. The Carter court addressed the
constitutionality of a warrantless dog sniff outside a storage unit within a
fenced-in, self-storage facility.39 Police observed seemingly suspicious ac-
tivity involving two vehicles at a storage unit.40 After conducting a warrant-
less dog sniff of the appellant’s units, they were alerted to the presence of a
controlled substance within one of the storage units.41 One of the vehicles
was registered to the appellant’s brother, who was the subject of a narcot-
ics-related police investigation.42 When applying for a search warrant of the
storage units, police relied on the above information while also noting
Carter’s and his brother’s criminal histories.43 Execution of the search war-
35. Id. at 137–40 (Page, J., concurring specially).
36. Id. at 138.
37. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 140 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
38. Id. at 139.
39. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 202–03 (Minn. 2005). For an in-depth discussion of the
Carter decision, see Rachel Bond & Theodora Gaitas, State v. Carter: The Minnesota Constitution
Protects Against Random and Suspicionless Dog Sniffs of Storage Units, 32 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1287 (2006).
40. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 203.
41. Id.
42. Id. This “suspicious behavior” hardly seems worthy of police involvement. While a BCA
agent observed two vehicles enter the storage facility, the record is silent on any other suspicious
behavior, and police executed the dog sniff four weeks after they observed this “suspicious behav-
ior.” Id.
43. Id. Later in the majority opinion, the Carter court noted that “[a] person’s criminal record
is among the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists
for a search warrant.” Id. at 205 (citing United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir.
1993)). Other case law in Minnesota supports this proposition. See, e.g., State v. Cavegn, 356
N.W.2d 671, 673 n.1 (Minn. 1984) (“[A] defendant’s prior convictions, if relevant, may be con-
sidered on the issue of probable cause”); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1980)
(noting that even a defendant’s “relatively minor trouble with the law” is of “some” probative
value in making a probable cause determination).
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rant at Carter’s storage unit led to the recovery of two firearms and
ammunition.44
Based on the recovery of this evidence, the State charged Carter with
being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.45 Carter moved to
suppress the evidence recovered from the storage unit, relying on Wiegand
to argue that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff
outside the storage unit, and absent this positive alert, the search warrant
was defective for want of probable cause.46 The district court denied
Carter’s suppression motion, reasoning that the positive dog sniff alert,
Carter’s criminal history, and his frequent visits to the unit all supported a
probable cause finding for the search warrant’s issuance.47 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, concluding that the Wiegand
decision did not apply to the present dog sniff of a storage unit’s exterior.48
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court first considered
whether the dog sniff outside Carter’s storage unit constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.49 To begin answering the question, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court surveyed prior dog sniff precedent from the United
States Supreme Court.50 The Carter majority rejected the argument that the
dog-sniff in that case resembled the thermal imaging technology in Kyllo v.
United States.51 Noting that the United States Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the precise question that Carter’s appeal presented, the court cited
cases from other states that involved similar circumstances: cases holding
44. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 204. Oddly, police found no drugs inside the storage unit despite
the positive alert from the trained narcotics-detection dog. See infra note 190 (exploring the pit-
falls of assuming drug-dog infallibility).
45. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 204 (citing MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subdivs. 1(b), (2) (2004)).
46. Id. (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002)).
47. The district court’s order did not opine on whether the warrant would have contained
sufficient probable cause without the dog sniff outside Carter’s storage unit. Id.
48. State v. Carter, 682 N.W.2d 648, 652–53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 697 N.W.2d 199
(Minn. 2005).
49. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 206. Before raising the question, the Carter court discussed
whether the search warrant possessed probable cause without the positive alert from the drug-
detection dog. Id. at 204–06. In doing so, the supreme court found that Carter’s criminal record,
his allegedly frequent visits to the storage unit, and his relationship with his brother, who also had
connections to criminal activity, could not support a probable cause finding for issuing the search
warrant for Carter’s storage unit. Id. at 206.
50. Id. at 207–08 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). In Caballes, the United
States Supreme Court found that the use of a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of a motor
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the dog could only detect the presence or
absence of narcotics. 543 U.S. at 409–10.
51. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208 (“[A] thermal imager is ‘a piece of technical equipment much
different from a dog.’”) (quoting State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Minn. 2002)). In Kyllo,
the United States Supreme Court held that police searched a home under the Fourth Amendment
when they used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat emanation levels in a private home. Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Yet the Caballes court explicitly declined to apply the
reasoning from Kyllo in the context of a dog sniff, instead affirming the notion that a dog sniff is
sui generis. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10.
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that dog sniffs conducted around the exterior of a storage unit did not con-
stitute a search under the federal constitution.52 Thus, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that the dog sniff outside Carter’s storage unit was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment.53
After disposing of Carter’s Fourth Amendment claim, the court next
examined whether the dog sniff outside the storage unit was a search under
the Minnesota Constitution.54 The Carter court relied on case law from
other jurisdictions that held that a dog sniff outside a storage unit was a
search for state constitutional purposes.55 Based on this authority, the su-
preme court found that citizens retain a greater expectation of privacy in
storage units under the Minnesota Constitution than the Fourth Amendment
and thus held that the use of a drug-detection dog outside these units was a
search for state constitutional purposes.56 Because the police lacked reason-
able suspicion about drugs in Carter’s storage unit, the court held that the
use of a narcotics-detection dog was an unreasonable search under the Min-
nesota Constitution.57
Justice Russell Anderson dissented, citing Justice Harlan’s famous
“reasonableness” test from Katz v. United States, and applying it to a dog
sniff outside a storage unit.58 Justice Anderson believed that while Carter
certainly had a legitimate expectation of privacy within the storage unit, the
same could not be true for the unit’s exterior.59 Lastly, Justice Anderson
raised several opposing points to the majority’s analysis, specifically: (1)
determining whether a drug-dog is fallible requires a case-by-case analysis
and should go to an issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination; (2)
relying on Kyllo for the proposition that drug-detection dogs reveal infor-
mation “previously unknowable without physical intrusion” was improper;
and (3) arguing that a storage unit conveys a heightened expectation of
52. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208–09 (citing People v. Wieser, 796 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1990);
State v. Stanilowski, 761 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Or. 1988)).
53. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 209.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 210 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 78–79 (Pa. 1987); McGahan
v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)). The Carter majority also noted the recent,
growing recognition that drug dogs can provide “false alerts.” Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 211.
57. Id. at 212. Minnesota is not alone in granting greater protection under its own constitu-
tion. See Mark E. Smith, Going to the Dogs: Evaluating the Proper Standard for Narcotic Detec-
tor Dog Searches of Private Residences, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 103, 105 n.7 (2009) (collecting cases).
58. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212–14 (Russell Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In his famous Katz concurrence, Justice
Harlan wrote that an expectation of privacy exists when a person exhibits an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and when society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. United States
v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). As a side-note, Justice Page again
concurred in the result in Carter, citing his concurrence in Wiegand. Id. at 212 (Page, J., concur-
ring) (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 137–40 (Minn. 2002)).
59. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 214 (Russell Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson noted
that the dog sniff in question occurred on a “semi-public” walkway, an area where he believed
Carter could not reasonably expect privacy. Id.
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privacy lacks force when dog sniffs of luggage and automobiles, which
serve the same function in holding personal items, have been considered
nonintrusive.60 Lastly, Justice Anderson contended that even under the ma-
jority’s logic, police still possessed reasonable suspicion of drug activity to
conduct a dog sniff outside the storage unit.61
C. State v. Davis
In the 2007 case of State v. Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
sidered what level of suspicion was required under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion for law enforcement to conduct a warrantless dog sniff in the common
hallway of an unsecured apartment building.62 Like Edstrom, the facts in
Davis involved police use of a narcotics-detection dog in the common hall-
way of an apartment building.63 Before conducting the dog sniff, police
received information from an employee at the apartment building that main-
tenance workers believed they had seen marijuana-growing lights in Da-
vis’s apartment.64 Police also learned that Davis refused to allow the
maintenance workers into his apartment to fix a potential water leak.65
Based on the above information, police conducted a warrantless dog
sniff in the common hallway of Davis’s apartment building.66 Following a
positive alert, police obtained and executed a search warrant for Davis’s
apartment, where they recovered various items of contraband.67 After being
charged with fifth-degree controlled substance possession and possession of
drug paraphernalia, Davis moved the district court for suppression of the
recovered evidence.68 The district court denied Davis’s suppression motion,
and the court of appeals affirmed.69
60. Id. at 214–15 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
61. Id. at 215.
62. Interestingly, Chief Justice Lorie Gildea, then an associate justice on the court, authored
the Davis majority opinion. See State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 2007). She would go
on to write for the majority in Edstrom. See Section II, Part D. An examination of Davis is
particularly useful in trying to analyze how the Edstrom court reached its decision. Detailed be-
low, the key distinction between the apartment building in Davis and that in Edstrom was the
building’s security. Also different from Edstrom, Davis retracted his argument that a dog sniff was
a search under the Fourth Amendment, instead challenging its propriety under only the Minnesota
Constitution. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 176 n.6.
63. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 175.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The supreme court noted that the record lacked any evidence showing how law en-
forcement could gain access to the apartment building when conducting the dog sniff. Id. at 175
n.3.
67. Id. at 175–76. Along with the information from the maintenance worker and the positive
alert from the dog sniff, police relied on Davis’s criminal history to obtain the search warrant. Id.
68. Id. at 176.
69. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 176. Davis contains an odd procedural history. The parties offered
no testimony at the district court. Id. Instead, they agreed to rely on the search warrant and accom-
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The supreme court first addressed what level of suspicion was consti-
tutionally required for police to conduct a warrantless dog sniff in the com-
mon hallway of an apartment building.70 Based on Davis’s argument—that
Wiegand and Carter required the police to possess probable cause before
conducting a dog sniff in an apartment hallway—the court fleshed out its
recent dog sniff precedent and noted that both cases only required that po-
lice possess reasonable suspicion of drug activity.71 The supreme court then
cited the balancing principle before turning to the specific facts of Davis’s
appeal.72
The Davis court framed the issue as whether police use of a dog sniff
in the common hallway of Davis’s apartment building required probable
cause under the Minnesota Constitution.73 The court found that Davis had
presented no evidence showing an expectation of privacy in the hallway
outside his residence.74 Equally unpersuasive to the court was Davis’s con-
tention that police use of the dog in the common hallway intruded upon the
privacy interest inside his residence, like the thermal technology at issue in
Kyllo.75 Instead, the supreme court cited Place and its prior dog sniff prece-
dents to affirm the proposition that a dog sniff is “sui generis” and thus
constitutes only a minimal intrusion.76 In determining that Davis lacked an
expectation of privacy in the common hallway, the court relied on its deci-
sion in Carter and concluded that a tenant must expect that other people
will lawfully be in the hallway and able to smell odors emanating from the
unit.77
Finding that the invasion into Davis’s privacy was minimal, the court
then engaged in the same balancing test it employed in Carter, weighing the
panying affidavit, the police reports, and their respective legal memoranda. Id. This left the record
underdeveloped on appeal.
70. Id. The supreme court noted that the state did not argue that the dog sniff amounted to a
search under the state constitution. Id. Thus, the majority found its Carter analysis to be control-
ling. Id.
71. Id. at 177–78 (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002); State v. Carter,
697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005)); see also supra notes 9–50.
72. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 178 (“Minnesota courts have balanced the nature and significance
of the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests . . . against the gravity of the public concern it
serves and the degree to which the conduct at issue advances the public interest.”) (citing State v.
Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 148, 150 (Minn. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 179. The court noted that Davis did not contend that the dog sniff intruded upon the
curtilage of his apartment. Id. at 179 n.10 (citation omitted). This fact also distinguishes Davis
from Edstrom.
75. Id. at 179 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30, 34–35 (2001)). The court
noted that “Davis makes no claim that the dog used outside his apartment was capable of detecting
more than simply the odor of illegal narcotics emanating from the inside of his residence.” Id.
76. In a footnote, the Davis court distinguished Carter because the dog in that case was
sniffing for odor “emanating from the unit,” while the dog sniff in the common hallway outside
Davis’s unit was less intrusive. Id. at 180 n.12 (citing State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211 (Minn.
2005)).
77. Id. (citing State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 210–11 (Minn. 2005)).
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state’s interest against Davis’s expectation of privacy.78 In doing so, the
Davis court affirmed the reasonable suspicion standard set forth in Carter.79
Based on this standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the record
information to evaluate whether police possessed reasonable suspicion
when they conducted the warrantless dog sniff.80 Emphasizing the facts that
a private citizen’s tip81 informed police that maintenance workers had seen
marijuana-growing lights in Davis’s apartment and that Davis had refused
to let maintenance workers inside his unit to fix a water leak, the court
found that police had reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.82
In his concurrence, Justice Paul Anderson noted that because Davis did
not show whether the dog sniff outside his apartment could alert to anything
besides the smell of illegal substances from within his apartment, the search
was reasonable.83 That said, if there had been evidence suggesting that the
dog sniff could reveal legal activity from within an apartment, Justice An-
derson conveyed he may have reached a different result.84 Justice Anderson
rebuked the adoption of the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis from Place that
a dog sniff is “sui generis.”85
Justice Alan Page dissented, arguing that the dog sniff was a search of
Davis’s apartment, rather than the hallway outside the apartment.86 Justice
Page analogized the dog sniff in Davis to the techniques that the govern-
78. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 180–81; see also supra note 73. As support for its decision to
consider the government’s interest against Davis’s privacy interest, the supreme court cited Place
and case law from other jurisdictions that had used this analysis. Id. at 181 (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990); Common-
wealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1987)) (footnote omitted). The court also cited its analy-
sis in Carter that “the government has a significant interest” in using narcotics-detection dogs and
that effective police investigations serve the public interest. Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 697
N.W.2d 199, 211–12 (Minn. 2005).
79. Id. at 181–82.
80. Id. at 182.
81. Minnesota courts presume tips from private citizens are credible. State v. Jones, 678
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004). This is particularly so when an informant gives self-identifying infor-
mation to police. City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888, 890 (Minn. 1988).
82. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182–83 (citing United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 70–71 (3d
Cir. 1993) (finding that probable cause existed for police to search hotel room when a private
citizen hotel housekeeper reported seeing items associated with narcotics activity and was refused
admission into the room until after the defendant removed a box with unknown contents)). The
supreme court’s opinion contrasted its finding in Carter that police did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to conduct a dog sniff outside a private storage unit when the available information revealed
that the defendant owned two storage units and sometimes visited them several times per day. Id.
at 183 (citing State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 2005)).
83. Id. at 184 (Paul Anderson, J., concurring).
84. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)).
85. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). Neither the Edstrom major-
ity nor the dissent addressed Justice Anderson’s concurrence from Davis, perhaps because Ed-
strom failed to show that the dog used for the sniff of his apartment door could not detect lawful
activity. Compare State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018), with Davis, 732 N.W.2d at
184 (Paul Anderson, J., concurring).
86. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 184–85 (Page, J., dissenting) (Justice Helen Meyer joined this
dissent).
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ment employed in Katz and Kyllo.87 He further stressed that courts should
classify police use of a dog sniff as sense-enhancing technology unavailable
to the public.88 Justice Page also disputed the majority’s use of a balancing
test to weigh the parties’ interests, contending such an application was
wrong in Carter and continued to be wrong in Davis.89 Citing Justice Sou-
ter’s dissent in Caballes, Justice Page argued that the continued classifica-
tion of a dog sniff as “minimally intrusive” was improper, particularly
because of potential pitfalls in their ability to detect narcotics accurately.90
In conclusion, Justice Page classified the majority’s opinion as a significant
departure from prior constitutional jurisprudence because it authorized a
warrantless search of a residence based on a standard less than probable
cause and without any exigencies.91
Wiegand, Carter, and Davis reflect the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
difficulty with formulating a precise standard for classifying warrantless
dog sniffs.92 Rather than adopting a uniform standard for evaluating police
use of a drug-detection dog, the supreme court scrutinized the location
where the dog sniff occurred. From there, the court has analyzed whether
this location is an area that holds a socially recognized expectation of pri-
vacy. With this backdrop in mind, it would seem apparent that Davis—a
case involving a dog sniff in an apartment’s common hallway—would con-
trol the facts of Edstrom’s case. But Florida v. Jardines, decided in 2013,
presented a new wrinkle for dog sniff cases.93
87. Id. at 184–85 (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (“[T]he reach of
[the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001) (rejecting the government’s
contention that its use of a thermal-imaging device was not a search and noting that the device’s
capability to reveal various heat levels constituted information about the home’s interior)). But the
places searched in Katz and Kyllo—a telephone booth and a private residence—are distinguisha-
ble from the common hallway at issue in Davis.
88. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 185 (Page, J., dissenting). This aspect of Justice Page’s argument
lacks support from any Minnesota or United States Supreme Court precedent. In fact, as noted
above, the Carter majority explicitly rejected any comparison between the thermal-imaging tech-
nology employed in Kyllo and police use of a dog sniff outside a storage unit. See supra note 39.
89. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 186 (Page, J., dissenting). Yet the majority’s use of the balancing
analysis stemmed from the court’s prior decision in Carter. Justice Page argued that the circum-
stances at issue in Carter did not require “necessarily swift” police action, the threshold question
in the Terry balancing test. Id. at 187 (citing State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211 (Minn. 2005)).
90. Id. at 188 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
91. Id. at 189. Of course, to accept this argument, one must embrace Justice Page’s premise
that the dog sniff searched Davis’s residence, rather than the common hallway outside the
apartment.
92. A final dog sniff precedent from the Minnesota Supreme Court is State v. Eichers. 853
N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2014). This case is not analyzed because it involved the warrantless dog sniff
of a package, rather than an apartment, an automobile, or the exterior of a storage unit. Id. at 116.
Moreover, the sniff in Eichers is distinguishable because it occurred in a UPS airport mailroom,
like the airport luggage sniff in Place. Id. at 125 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983)). The Eichers court found that the expectation of privacy in a mailed package is far lower
than the locations involved in Davis and Carter. Id. at 126.
93. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
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In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court held that police violate
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures when they use a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a single-
family home.94 The Court limited its holding, finding only that the police
action at issue violated the property-rights prong of the Fourth Amendment,
but declining to opine whether the dog sniff violated the Fourth Amend-
ment’s expectation of privacy prong.95
II. THE EDSTROM CASE
A. Facts
In October 2015, police received information from a confidential in-
formant that Courtney John Edstrom was selling methamphetamine from a
Brooklyn Park apartment building.96 This informant also told police that
Edstrom lived on the third floor of this building, drove a black Cadillac
sedan, and had been seen carrying a pistol within the last three months.97
Police showed the informant a picture of Edstrom, and the informant af-
firmed that the man in the photo was the individual selling narcotics in
Brooklyn Park.98 Police used vehicle registration records to confirm that
Edstrom did in fact drive a black Cadillac.99
Based on these facts, police conducted a warrantless dog sniff in Ed-
strom’s apartment building.100 Police gained access to the apartment build-
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. at 5–8, 10. Jardines and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), represent the
Supreme Court’s “rediscovery” of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights prong. Before these
decisions, the Court normally employed the two-prong Katz expectation of privacy test, without
regard to the curtilage or property rights analysis, when analyzing unlawful Fourth Amendment
search or seizure cases.
96. State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 2018). Because the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision reversed most aspects of the court of appeals’ decision, I cite exclusively to its
presentation of the district court’s factual findings. See id. at 524.
97. Id. at 515.
98. Id. Edstrom did not challenge, and neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court
discussed, the propriety of the informant’s identification. In State v. Smith, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals concluded that although an informant’s identification of an individual was unnecessarily
suggestive, there was a significant independent origin for that informant’s identification. No. A10-
1293, 2011 WL 3241624, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2011). While it is likely that a similar
result would have been reached here, the record lacked evidence on the factors courts normally
consider in evaluating pretrial identifications.
99. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 515.
100. Id. Interestingly, had police obtained a warrant before conducting the dog sniff, this case
would have remained purely hypothetical. The facts suggest police could have received a warrant
before conducting a dog sniff, especially considering the lower reasonable suspicion standard that
Minnesota has adopted for conducting dog sniffs. That said, binding Minnesota appellate case law
at that time reinforced the notion that law enforcement did not need to possess a warrant before
conducting the dog sniff. See State v. Luhm, 880 N.W.2d 606, 609, 617 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that a dog sniff in a secured condominium building was not a search); see also State v.
Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (holding that a dog sniff in an unsecured apartment
building was a search requiring reasonable suspicion under the Minnesota Constitution).
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ing through a key that property management placed inside a Knox Box.101
As police walked the dog down the common hallway, it sniffed other apart-
ment doors but did not alert to narcotics until sniffing the door of apartment
#305.102 Following this positive alert, police applied for and received a
search warrant.103 Within the warrant affidavit, law enforcement presented
details surrounding the dog sniff, including that the dog alerted after snif-
fing the seam of the apartment door.104 Police executed the warrant for
Edstrom’s apartment and recovered firearms, ammunition, scales with
methamphetamine residue, some marijuana, and about 226 grams of
methamphetamine.105
101. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 515–16. The Edstrom majority summarized the suppression
hearing testimony about the Knox Box:
A Knox Box is a locked key box that an apartment building owner in Brooklyn Park
may choose to have installed on the outside of a building. Anyone with a key to open
the Knox Box can access a set of keys for a building. Building owners typically install a
Knox Box to facilitate law enforcement access in cases of medical emergencies, crimi-
nal complaints, tenant disputes, foot patrols to become familiar with the layout of the
building, and dog sniffs. Building owners are generally aware that police occasionally
enter their buildings via these boxes.
Id.
102. Id. at 515. The parties disputed the exact location of the dog sniff. At oral argument,
Justice Lillehaug questioned the attorney representing the State on the legality of the sniffs of
other apartment doors. Supreme Court Oral Arguments – State v. Edstrom A16-1382, MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT, at 02:27, (April 11, 2018) http://www.mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt/OralArgu
mentWebcasts/ArgumentDetail.aspx?vid=1201. These sniffs seem dubious because the record
lacked evidence of criminal activity from any apartment other than #305. Despite Justice Lil-
lehaug’s emphasis of this point, the majority did not address this issue.
103. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 515.
104. Id.
105. Id. Law enforcement also recovered some personal items attributable to Edstrom. Id. The
court likely included this fact because there was some confusion over whether Edstrom resided at
the apartment. That said, the supreme court noted that the State never raised a standing argument.
Id. at 515 n.2. Interestingly, the issue of “automatic standing” in the context of the Minnesota
Constitution has not been fully fleshed out. See citations below. Edstrom clearly bore the burden
of establishing a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. It is equally clear that the federal
constitution does not confer standing automatically to a defendant, even when he is charged with a
possession offense, as Edstrom was here. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
Whether the Minnesota Constitution confers automatic standing on defendants charged with pos-
session crimes is unresolved. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 594 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (declining to consider an “automatic standing” argument for failure to raise it before the
district court); see also State v. Reynolds, 578 N.W.2d 762, 765 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (declining
to consider “automatic standing” because on the facts of the case, the defendant did not possess
cocaine, making the question moot). Yet the Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that “[a] charge
of possession no longer gives a defendant ‘automatic standing.’” State v. Robinson, 458 N.W.2d
421, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
Had the State raised a standing argument, perhaps the supreme court would have decided this
case on narrower grounds. See State v. deLottinville, 890 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 2017) (“Fourth
Amendment rights are ‘personal’ and ‘may not be vicariously asserted.’”) (quoting Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“[I]t is
proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit
from the [Exclusionary] [R]ule’s protections.”) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). While stand-
ing was ultimately not an issue for the Edstrom court, the lack of clarity in Minnesota case law
could have made this an interesting issue, as both parties seemed to assume Edstrom’s expectation
of privacy in apartment #305.
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B. Procedural History
Following execution of the search warrant, the state charged Edstrom
with two counts of first-degree controlled substances crimes, one count of
prohibited person in possession of a firearm, and one count of fifth-degree
controlled substance crime.106 Edstrom moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained from the search of apartment #305, arguing the warrantless dog sniff
violated his constitutional rights.107 At a Rasmussen108 hearing, the State
offered officer testimony about the Knox Box in Edstrom’s apartment
building and the circumstances of the dog sniff.109 The district court denied
Edstrom’s motion to suppress the recovered methamphetamine, marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, and firearms.110 The district court’s reasoning was two-
fold: (1) Edstrom lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common
hallway of the apartment building; and (2) Edstrom could not have a prop-
erty right in the common hallway area because it was not within the curti-
lage of his apartment.111
C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
In a unanimous published decision, authored by Judge Roger
Klaphake, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s de-
nial of suppression.112 The court of appeals framed the issue as whether the
district court erred in concluding that police use of a narcotics-detection dog
at the door of an apartment within a secured, multiunit building was not a
search under the United States or Minnesota Constitutions.113 The court
first considered Edstrom’s assertion that the sniff of his apartment door vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment on a property rights theory.114 Using the fac-
tors set out in United States v. Dunn,115 the court of appeals rejected
106. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 515 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subdiv. 1(1)–(2), 624.713,
subdiv. 1(2), and 152.025, subdiv. 2(a)(1) (2014)).
107. Id. at 516.
108. Rasmussen hearings are Minnesota’s colloquial name for suppression hearings. The name
derives from the case State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3 (Minn. 1965), in which
the Minnesota Supreme Court established the procedure to be followed when a criminal defendant
alleges police action has violated her constitutional rights.
109. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 515–16. Although the Edstrom court never explicitly states this,
the fact that police had access to the Knox Box may have determined the outcome. This can be
read as a sign for prosecutors to introduce this evidence at Rasmussen hearings, which may also
include testimony from a landlord or property management agent on the ability of law enforce-
ment to enter a given multi-unit building with ownership’s consent.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. State v. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d in part, 916
N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018).
113. Id. at 459.
114. Id. at 460–61.
115. In United States v. Dunn, the United States Supreme Court outlined four relevant factors
for determining whether a particular area constituted protected curtilage or was an unprotected
“open field.” 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). Interestingly, the majority in Jardines—the United States
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Edstrom’s claim, instead determining that the area immediately near his
apartment door was not curtilage—the enclosed area immediately surround-
ing one’s home which retains legal significance.116
After rejecting Edstrom’s curtilage argument, the court of appeals con-
sidered whether police violated an area in which he had a reasonable expec-
Supreme Court’s most recent dog-sniff case—did not mention the Dunn factors. Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
116. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 460–61 (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300). This definition of curti-
lage is in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Additionally, the court of appeals relied on
its prior published decision in State v. Luhm, a case involving a similar issue. 880 N.W.2d 606
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016). Using the Dunn factors in Luhm, the Minnesota Court of Appeals con-
cluded “[t]he area immediately outside the door of a condominium unit in a secured, multiunit
condominium building is not curtilage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution so as to preclude a law-enforcement officer from conducting a warrantless dog sniff
in that area.” Id. at 609. While Edstrom argued that the case law was evolving on the curtilage
issue, the court of appeals affirmed its decision in Luhm. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 461 (citing
United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the combination of
the Dunn factors and daily experience supports a finding of curtilage in the area immediately in
front of an apartment door in a townhome complex); People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 622 (Ill.
2016) (concluding that a police officer’s entry into a “locked apartment building at 3:20 a.m. with
a drug-detection dog” was unlawful because the “investigation took place in a constitutionally
protected area”)).
Even after Jardines, the majority approach continues to reject the notion that common areas
of multiunit dwellings are curtilage. See Brief for States of Utah, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 5, People v. Bonilla, 120 N.E.3d 930, 937 (Ill. 2018) (No. 18-1219) (citing United
States v. Jones, 893 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2018) (shared parking lot of a multiunit dwelling was not
within the curtilage of the defendant’s apartment); United States v. Makell, 721 F. App’x 307, 308
(4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“[C]ommon hallway of the apartment building, including the area in
front of Makell’s door, was not within the curtilage of his apartment.”), cert. denied, No. 18-5509
(Dec. 10, 2018); Seay v. United States, No. 14-0614, 2018 WL 1583555, at *4–5 (D. Md. Apr. 2,
2018) (common hallway in apartment not curtilage), appeal dismissed, 739 F. App’x 193 (4th Cir.
2018); United States v. Bain, 155 F. Supp. 3d 107, 118–20 (D. Mass. 2015) (area in front of door
of apartment is not curtilage), aff’d, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-7494 (Apr.
23, 2018); United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2016) (common area in base-
ment was not curtilage); Luhm, 880 N.W.2d at 615–18 (interior hallway of condominium building
not curtilage); State v. Mouser, 119 A.3d 870, 875 (N.H. 2015) (shared parking area behind
multiunit dwelling not curtilage); State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 831, 837–38 (N.D. 2015) (com-
mon hallway in condominium building not curtilage); Lindsey v. State, 127 A.3d 627, 642–43
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (common area outside door not curtilage); State v. Dumstrey, 859
N.W.2d 138, 142–46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014) (secured shared parking garage not curtilage); State v.
Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 682 (N.D. 2013) (“secured common hallway” not curtilage); United
States v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2013) (two-to-three-foot strip of grass between
private patio and common sidewalk, as well as sidewalk itself, were not curtilage)).
That said, a notable exception to the majority approach is found in People v. Bonilla, where
the Illinois Supreme Court found that the common area immediately outside the appellant’s apart-
ment door was constitutionally protected curtilage. Bonilla, 120 N.E.3d at 937. Other post-
Jardines cases have also taken the minority position that certain common areas in multi-residence
dwellings constitute curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir.
2016) (area “six to eight” inches from townhome-apartment front door on development’s central
courtyard walkway was curtilage); United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1126–28 (8th Cir.
2015) (area “six to ten inches” outside apartment window near shrubbery that partially covered
window was curtilage); State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“narrowly
hold[ing] that the curtilage extended to appellee’s front door threshold located in a[n] . . . upstairs
landing” shared by two apartments).
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tation of privacy.117 First, the court cited hornbook Fourth Amendment law
related to the ability to bring such challenges: “[the] ‘capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place.’”118 The court of appeals also noted “[a]
subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”119
Though recognizing a concurrence does not constitute binding prece-
dent,120 the court of appeals agreed with Edstrom by relying on Justice Ka-
gan’s analysis in Jardines.121 Following Justice Kagan’s logic, the court
distinguished the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Caballes, stat-
ing “in Caballes, the Court was considering the narrow issue of whether
reasonable suspicion was required to use a narcotics-detection dog to sniff
the exterior of a motor vehicle during a lawful traffic stop supported by
probable cause.”122 The court of appeals thus held that under the Fourth
Amendment, police must obtain a warrant or possess a valid exception to
the warrant requirement before conducting a dog sniff at an apartment door
within a secured multiunit building.123
After concluding that the warrantless dog sniff violated Edstrom’s
Fourth Amendment rights, the court of appeals analyzed the same issue
under the Minnesota Constitution.124 The court cited two familiar principles
related to the interplay between its analysis of the state and federal constitu-
tions: (1) that the Minnesota Constitution cannot afford less protection than
the United States Constitution; and (2) that Minnesota courts have afforded
citizens greater protection under the state constitution.125 In summary, the
117. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 461. In support of his expectation of privacy argument, Edstrom
relied heavily on Justice Kagan’s concurrence from Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–15 (2013) (Kagan,
J., concurring). Edstrom argued this analysis effectively overruled the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2007). The court of appeals agreed. See infra
note 122.
118. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 461, rev’d in part, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018) (quoting
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)); accord Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
119. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 461 (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95–96 (1990)).
120. Id. at 462 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1997)).
121. Id. at 462–63. Justice Kagan premised her argument on the notion that a narcotics dog is
a “super-sensitive instrument,” and the use of one on the porch of a home violated the defendant’s
expectation of privacy. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–13 (Kagan, J., concurring). But the Minne-
sota Supreme Court dispensed with this analysis in its Edstrom opinion, discussed infra notes
141–43.
122. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 463 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406–07 (2005)).
The court of appeals quoted Justice Kagan’s concurrence to distinguish Caballes. See id. (quoting
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 14 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring)) (“[P]eople’s expectations of privacy are
much lower in their cars than in their homes.”).
123. Id.
124. Id., rev’d in part, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018).
125. Id. at 463–64. (“While we may interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide more
protection than the [United States] Constitution, it may not afford less.”) (quoting State v. Mc-
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court of appeals held that the use of a narcotics-detection dog from the
common hallway within a secured apartment building constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution.126 Thus, because police did not possess a warrant, and the
State had not shown an exception to the warrant requirement, the court of
appeals reversed the district court’s denial of Edstrom’s suppression
motion.127
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review,
and oral arguments were heard on April 14, 2018. The three-justice128 ma-
Bride, 666 N.W.2d 351, 361 (Minn. 2003)). The Minnesota Court of Appeals also noted that
Minnesota appellate courts have a history of affording greater protections under the state constitu-
tion than already provided under the federal constitution. Id. (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d
125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that the use of a narcotics-detection dog to sniff the exterior of
a motor vehicle during a traffic stop for routine equipment violation required “reasonable, articul-
able suspicion of drug-related criminal activity”); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d
183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (addressing temporary roadblocks to discover evidence of alcohol-im-
paired driving); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (defining when a
seizure has occurred)).
126. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 465. Again, the court of appeals based its decision solely on the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution. The result here may have been different if the State had relied on
the good faith exception. See id. at 463 n.3 (“We do not address this argument because the State
does not raise the good-faith exception.”). While the Minnesota Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
the good-faith exception is somewhat murky, its recent decision in State v. Lindquist adopted the
exception from Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863,
871 (Minn. 2015) (adopting exception when law enforcement has in good faith relied on existing
binding appellate precedent) (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 241). But Minnesota has not adopted the
full-fledged Leon good-faith exception. See Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 876–77 (declining to decide
whether the exception explained in Leon should apply in Minnesota).
Federal case law would have supported a potential good-faith argument about law enforce-
ment’s reliance on binding appellate precedent. In United States v. Davis, the Eighth Circuit de-
clined application of the exclusionary rule in a case involving police conducting a dog sniff of an
apartment door. 760 F.3d 901, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2014). In Davis, the defendant argued that it was
unreasonable for police to rely on binding appellate precedent in conducting the warrantless dog
sniff because the Supreme Court had heard oral argument in Jardines. Id. at 905; see also United
States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding that officers reasona-
bly relied on binding circuit precedent when, without a warrant, they installed a GPS device to
monitor the movements of a car prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)).
127. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d at 465.
128. Only five members of the Minnesota Supreme Court considered this case. See State v.
Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018). Chief Justice Lorie Gildea, Justice G. Barry Anderson,
and Justice Anne McKeig joined the majority. Justices David Lillehaug and Margaret Chutich
dissented. See id. Justice Natalie Hudson recused herself from the case, while Justice Paul Thissen
had not yet assumed his duties on the supreme court following Justice David Stras’s elevation to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. (explaining that Justices Hudson and Thissen took no
part in considering Edstrom).
Based purely on ideology, the outcome would have likely differed had Justices Hudson and
Thissen also factored into deciding this case. While one cannot precisely determine how those
justices who did not hear the case would have voted, some key evidence allows one to make a
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jority opinion, written by Chief Justice Gildea, framed the issue as “whether
a warrantless narcotics-dog sniff in the hallway outside respondent’s apart-
ment violated [Edstrom’s] right to be free from unreasonable searches
under the United States or Minnesota Constitution.”129
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis
differently than the court of appeals. The court noted that a search can occur
under the Fourth Amendment in two ways: “First, there can be a search
when the government physically intrudes into a constitutionally protected
area. Second, there can be a search when the government intrudes upon a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”130 Examining the dog sniff
under the property-rights prong of the Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered whether the dog sniffed the curtilage of Ed-
strom’s home.131
Noting that whether an area is curtilage requires a fact-specific in-
quiry,132 the Minnesota Supreme Court mirrored the court of appeals’ anal-
ysis in applying the Dunn factors133 to the area outside Edstrom’s apartment
door.134 The court opined that the first Dunn factor—the proximity of the
area to the home—weighed in Edstrom’s favor because the common hall-
way and space beyond the apartment door were in close physical proximity
to his home. Even so, the Edstrom court then concluded that the remaining
Dunn factors weighed against finding the area immediately outside Ed-
strom’s apartment door to be curtilage.135 The court noted that Edstrom
failed to establish his exclusive use or possession of the common hallway
“best guess.” Then-Judge Hudson’s dissent in State v. Eichers provides strong evidence that she
likely would have reached the opposite conclusion of the Edstrom majority. See State v. Eichers,
840 N.W.2d 210, 230–32 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting), aff’d, 853 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. 2014).
129. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 514.
130. Id. at 517 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 n.3 (2012); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979)).
131. Id. at 517–18. Like the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that an
area outside a person’s home may be constitutionally protected curtilage. See id. (citing Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
132. Id. at 518 (citing State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2018) (noting that when
Minnesota courts consider whether an area is curtilage, “we look to ‘whether the area in question
is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of
Fourth Amendment protection’”)).
133. See State v. Edstrom, 901 N.W.2d 455, 460–61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d in part, 916
N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018).
134. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 518 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987)
(“[The] central component . . . [is] whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated with
the sanctity of a [person’s] home and the privacies of life.”)).
135. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court cited Lindsey v. State, 127 A.3d 627, 642–43 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2015), as an example of a case that applied the Dunn factors and held that a narcotic
dog’s sniff in the hallway outside a defendant’s apartment did not implicate the curtilage of that
apartment. The use of a non-binding, intermediate appellate court’s decision seems unusual. The
supreme court noted that the Lindsey court reached its decision because “the area was observable
by a passerby” and the intimacies of the home did not extend to the common hallway. See Ed-
strom, 916 N.W.2d at 518.
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outside his apartment door.136 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals’ holding that the dog sniff did not implicate the curti-
lage of Edstrom’s residence.137
After rejecting Edstrom’s property rights Fourth Amendment claim,
the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the dog sniff violated Ed-
strom’s reasonable expectation of privacy.138 The court cited the familiar
Justice Harlan concurrence from Katz as its baseline test139 and noted that
“even government activity that does not physically intrude upon the home
can invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.”140 The court then cited
Kyllo for the proposition that the use of “a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion . . . is a ‘search’ and is presump-
tively unreasonable without a warrant.”141
In the majority’s opinion, the key inquiry in evaluating the govern-
ment’s actions is whether the device can detect both lawful and unlawful
activity.142 The court, citing Place, concluded that a dog sniff could only
reveal illegal activity because the sniff “discloses only the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics, a contraband item.”143 From there, the majority reasoned
that because one cannot possess a legitimate interest in possessing contra-
band,144 “government conduct that only reveals the possession of contra-
band ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”145
Concluding that Edstrom had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the
majority addressed Edstrom and the court of appeals’ contrary conten-
tion.146 At the threshold, the Edstrom majority was not impressed by these
arguments: “Against the weight of this precedent, Edstrom and the court of
appeals rely on Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines to support the con-
clusion that the dog sniff was a search.”147 Diving deeper, the Minnesota
136. Id. at 519.
137. Id. at 521.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (determining that Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz represents the proper inquiry when evaluating governmental intrusions under the Fourth
Amendment).
140. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 521.
141. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)).
142. Id. at 521–22 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005)).
143. Id. at 522 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). The majority’s
reliance on Place is questionable based on the many factual distinctions between the two cases.
Place involved the dog sniff of luggage in a public airport. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
698–99 (1983). Those actions differ greatly from what police did in entering the multiunit build-
ing and sniffing the area immediately outside Edstrom’s door.
144. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 522 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (quot-
ing United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984))).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Supreme Court declined to adopt Justice Kagan’s concurrence from
Jardines, instead criticizing her analysis for failing to recognize the differ-
ence between what a drug dog can detect and what the technology in cases
like Kyllo reveals.148
Concluding that the dog sniff was not a search under either the prop-
erty rights or reasonable expectation of privacy prongs of the Fourth
Amendment, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether a search oc-
curred under the Minnesota Constitution.149 Recognizing the principle that
the Minnesota Constitution cannot afford less protection, and in some cases
may afford more protection, than the Fourth Amendment,150 the majority
examined its decision in Davis.151 Edstrom sought to distinguish Davis on
two bases: (1) the court in Davis was dealing with a dog sniff which oc-
curred in the common hallway of an apartment, markedly different from the
sniff at the apartment door; and (2) the building where the search occurred
in Davis was open to the public, while the building here was accessible only
to residents.152
Addressing Edstrom’s first attempt to distinguish Davis, the majority
noted that the Davis court “acknowledged that the search warrant affidavit
stated that the narcotics dog sniffed at the threshold of the door.”153 Be-
cause the sniff here occurred at the seam of the door, the majority found
Davis to be akin: “Any distinction in this case between the seam of the door
and the threshold of the door is one without difference. Both refer to areas
in the hallway immediately adjacent to the door, and indisputably beyond
the interior of the apartment.”154 While noting that Edstrom was correct
about the difference in building access between his case and the facts in
Davis, the court similarly rebuked Edstrom’s second argument to distin-
guish Davis:
148. Id. The Edstrom majority described what it perceived as a key flaw in Justice Kagan’s
concurrence, specifically:
Focusing solely on the fact that drug-sniffing dogs are not in general public use, she
made no distinction between the limited nature of what drug-sniffing dogs detect—
contraband—and the indiscriminate nature of the thermal imager at issue in Kyllo,
which detects information about a wide variety of lawful and highly personal conduct.
Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)).
149. Id. at 523. Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is textually identical to the
Fourth Amendment and provides the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 10; State
v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 209 (Minn. 2005) (recognizing that this provision in Article I, Section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution is “textually identical” to the Fourth Amendment).
150. “Because of the textual similarity, ‘[Minnesota courts] will not construe our state consti-
tution as providing more protection for individual rights than does the federal constitution unless
there is a principled basis to do so.’” Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 523 (quoting Kahn v. Griffin, 701
N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2005)).
151. Id. (citing State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2007)).
152. Id. at 523–24.
153. Id. at 523 (citing State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 2007)).
154. Id. at 524.
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The fact remains, however, that anyone with keys, including the
police, had access to this building. While Edstrom may reasona-
bly expect that persons without keys will not access the building,
he may not reasonably expect that police will not use the keys
voluntarily provided to them by the building owner to access the
building for law-enforcement-related purposes.155
In summary, the majority affirmed the court of appeals’ decision re-
lated to the curtilage analysis of the common hallway but reversed the court
of appeals’ conclusion that the dog sniff violated Edstrom’s expectation of
privacy.156 The majority relegated perhaps the most important part of its
analysis to a footnote, asserting:
Jardines did not disturb this well-settled treatment of dog sniffs.
It was not merely the presence of the dog sniffing for narcotics
that constituted a search in Jardines; it was the government
agents entering the curtilage of the home not simply to talk to the
occupant—just as any person could do—but to search for evi-
dence of a crime (citation omitted). The presence of the dog is
immaterial if there is no entry into the curtilage, nor does the
presence of a dog create curtilage where it would not otherwise
be.157
In dissent, Justice Lillehaug asserted that the majority effectively read
out the area “immediately surrounding” the home from the Jardines deci-
sion.158 Unlike the court of appeals, Justice Lillehaug argued a search oc-
curred based on the property rights analysis used by the Jardines
majority.159 In concluding that the dog sniff here occurred within the curti-
lage of Edstrom’s home, Justice Lillehaug cast doubt on the majority’s reli-
ance on the Dunn factors.160 But even if the Dunn factors were relevant, the
dissent argued their application proved that the area outside Edstrom’s
apartment door was curtilage.161
155. Id.
156. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 524.
157. Id. at 516 n.6. The distinction between the apartment hallway and the front porch in
Jardines is perhaps the tipping point of the case. The supreme court did little to address this
distinction, instead affirming its prior precedent from Davis.
158. Id. at 524 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 525 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Lillehaug declined to adopt the
court of appeals’ analysis, instead trying to comport his dissent with the Jardines majority opin-
ion. As discussed in Part III, Section C, the court of appeals concluded a search occurred because
police invaded an area where Edstrom had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Ed-
strom, 901 N.W.2d 455, 463–65 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
160. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 526 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Noting that the Jardines majority
did not use the Dunn factors in concluding that a search occurs when police take a drug dog to the
front porch of a home, Justice Lillehaug would not have applied them to this case. Id. Instead,
citing two recent Supreme Court decisions which resolved curtilage issues without employing the
Dunn factors, Justice Lillehaug reasoned that their application was better suited for cases “that
determine the boundaries between curtilage and ‘open fields.’” Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, 6 (2013); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670–71 (2018)).
161. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 526–27 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)).
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Justice Lillehaug reasoned that all four Dunn factors favored Edstrom:
(1) Proximity: the area where the dog sniff in Edstrom’s apartment building
was within the “immediate surroundings” of the interior of the apartment,
like Jardines.162 (2) Whether the area is enclosed: Justice Lillehaug be-
lieved that  this factor in the curtilage analysis supports his conclusion that
the Dunn factors should only be applied to “open-fields” cases. Even if the
factor should be applied, Justice Lillehaug found it favored Edstrom be-
cause the area just outside his apartment doorway was included within an
enclosure—“a locked building, albeit one accessible to police via a Knox
Box.”163 (3) The nature of the use to which the area is put: Justice Lil-
lehaug reasoned “[d]oors are obviously necessary for apartment life.”164 In
his view, it is this logic that led the Supreme Court to hold that the front
porch in Jardines was curtilage, even though it was in open view and there
was no evidence it was used for intimate purposes.165 (4) The steps taken to
obscure activities from passerby: Justice Lillehaug concluded that this fac-
tor cut both ways: As a tenant, Edstrom had no right to block persons from
accessing the area just outside his hallway, yet because the apartment build-
ing contained a secured entrance, the public generally could not access the
building.166
Justice Lillehaug also relied on United States v. Hopkins, a recent
Eighth Circuit decision that addressed a dog sniff in a multiunit townhome
complex.167 His dissent opposed the majority’s two attempts to distinguish
Hopkins. First, Justice Lillehaug argued that the majority’s classification of
the door in Hopkins as “unshared” was misleading and downright inaccu-
rate.168 The townhouse area at issue in Hopkins was shared with at least one
other residence.169 Second, Justice Lillehaug disputed the majority’s classi-
fication of the Hopkins court’s treatment of a prior Eighth Circuit case,
United States v. Brooks.170 The Edstrom majority read Hopkins as being a
limitation on the implied license for law enforcement to invoke when ap-
proaching a residence, something absent in Edstrom’s case because build-
ing management had allowed law enforcement to enter through the Knox
162. Id. at 526.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 527.
165. Id. at 526–27. Justice Lillehaug noted that the type of tool that police use is irrelevant
under the Jardines analysis; once police have made a physical intrusion into constitutionally pro-
tected curtilage, a search has occurred. See id. at 527.
166. Id. at 527 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
167. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 527 (citing United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726 (8th Cir.
2016)).
168. Id. (citing United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 729, 732 (8th Cir. 2016)).
169. Id. (citing United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2016)).
170. Id. at 528 (citing United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2011)).
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Box key.171 In contrast, Justice Lillehaug emphasized the fact that Brooks
was decided before Jardines and that Hopkins accurately reflects the change
in law that Jardines brought about.172 Justice Lillehaug highlighted the fact
that the hallway outside Edstrom’s apartment was secured from members of
the public, presenting a stronger case than the defendant in Hopkins.173 In
conclusion, Justice Lillehaug noted the troubling distinction between the
Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners versus apartment renters evident
in the majority’s holding.174 Put simply, Justice Lillehaug read Jardines as
prohibiting police from employing a dog sniff at a home’s threshold, no
matter the type of the home.175
III. AFTER EDSTROM
In analyzing the Edstrom decision, it seems evident that the Minnesota
Supreme Court followed its existing precedent, yet perhaps failed to con-
sider what changes Jardines brought to Fourth Amendment law. After ana-
lyzing Edstrom, the significant implications of the court’s decision also bear
mentioning. Last, a recent Minnesota Court of Appeals case involving a dog
sniff provides an important illustration of how Edstrom’s analysis will be
used in future dog-sniff cases.176
A. Analyzing Edstrom
It is difficult to call the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision “wrong.”
The wealth of state and federal case law support the majority’s conclusions
that (1) common areas in multi-resident buildings are not curtilage; and (2)
there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy from searches—like dog
sniffs—which only reveal the presence or absence of unlawful activity.177
And the majority opinion in Edstrom can hardly be described as a radical
shift from prior Minnesota Supreme Court dog sniff case law. Rather, it
closely mirrors the court’s prior decision in Davis, which dealt with similar
facts.178 Yet one major distinction in Edstrom is that the court dispensed
with any notion that the nature of the item being sniffed is relevant to the
171. Id. at 520–21 n.9. The phrase “implied license” derives from Jardines, where the United
States Supreme Court held that police exceeded the scope of any implied license when they sought
to conduct a dog sniff on a home’s front porch. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–8 (2013).
172. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 528 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2016); State v. Kono,
152 A.3d 1, 26 (Conn. 2016) (discussing housing disparities based on race and income)).
175. Id.
176. The most glaring implication from Edstrom is that those who reside in multiunit dwell-
ings receive less constitutional protection than those who own homes. Compare Edstrom, 916
N.W.2d at 523–24, with Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11–12.
177. See Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 831 n.7
(2010) (collecting cases); Chase, supra note 9, at 1303–05.
178. See State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2007).
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dog sniff analysis; instead it is the minimally intrusive nature of the sniff
itself that courts should consider.179
The Knox Box may have also been a key factor in why the court af-
firmed the dog sniff. Although most of the discussion on this point was
relegated to a footnote and absent from the court’s substantive analysis, it
bears mentioning given the Court’s reemphasis on the Fourth Amendment’s
property rights concept in Jardines.180 Without a warrant or other lawful
right of access to the secured residence’s common hallway, the dog sniff
would have likely been unlawful. But the fact that building management at
least impliedly consented to the dog sniff by installation of the Knox Box
makes the conduct less objectionable under the Jardines property rights
approach.
A major issue in cases with facts like Edstrom is the lack of guidance
from the United States Supreme Court, which has yet to address what rights
tenants should have in the space directly outside their homes. While Justice
Lillehaug saw Jardines as implicitly embracing a property right for tenants
in the area immediately next to their entry doors, his leap in logic from
homeowners to renters lacks the support of United States Supreme Court
precedent. Case law, such as Place and Caballes, is highly deferential to the
police practice of using dogs to detect narcotics, particularly when police
are lawfully present in the area where the dog sniff occurs.181
Yet the arguments within Justice Lillehaug’s dissent are compelling.
Particularly glaring is the disparity that current case law places between
homeowners and renters. Is this something that makes sense? More troub-
ling are the disparities in home ownership based on race and lower income,
which themselves correlate with each other.182 Edstrom highlights that
179. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 522 n.10 (citations omitted). The court dispelled any notion that
Caballes should not apply to the hallway sniff, asserting that Place makes clear that the nature of
the sniff itself, rather than the character of the sniffed item, is the pertinent consideration for
analytical purposes. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). But before
Edstrom, Minnesota’s dog sniff precedent seemed to focus on the nature of the item being sniffed,
for instance, the storage unit in Carter, the automobile’s exterior in Wiegand, or the common
hallway in Davis.
180. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 passim (2013).
181. See Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 523–24, 528 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); Jardines, 569 U.S.
at 11–12.
182. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 528 (Lillehaug J., dissenting) (citing State v. Kono, 152 A.3d 1,
26 (Conn. 2016)). Certainly, one has to acknowledge that alternative arguments exist. For in-
stance, the Edstrom logic still applies to condominium owners, see State v. Luhm, 880 N.W.2d
606 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming dog-sniff searches in multiunit condominium building), and
the disparities in condo ownership versus apartment and home ownership are likely less stagger-
ing. The crucial opposing argument still centers on the fact that society has declined to afford
individuals a privacy interest in possessing contraband. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408
(2005) (explaining that individuals do not retain a “legitimate” expectation of privacy in possess-
ing contraband).
Yet the distinction that Edstrom draws from Jardines is far from unreasonable, at least when
analyzed on a blank slate. Residents in multiunit dwellings do not usually exercise dominion or
control in the common hallways outside their units. In fact, this is one of the key distinctions
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homeowners, who are more likely to be in suburban or rural areas, enjoy a
greater sense of privacy than urban apartment renters. In turn, this could
further perpetrate disparities within the criminal justice system, something
unlikely to garner or restore confidence in what many community members
perceive to be an unfair process.183
Certainly, renters abandon some luxuries that accompany owning a
home. Yet it seems dubious that police cannot conduct a dog sniff on a
home’s front porch, but the same conduct is permissible outside an apart-
ment’s door. Because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
“reasonableness,”184 one has to question just how reasonable it is for police
to use a drug-detection dog within apartment buildings without the need to
obtain a search warrant. The answer to such a question turns on what we as
a society are prepared to recognize as illicit contraband.185 For decades,
society has heavily criminalized narcotics possession and sale.186 In turn,
police have employed invasive detection tactics to combat narcotics activ-
ity, including the use of drug-detection dogs.187 Despite the recent trend
toward marijuana decriminalization,188 the continued criminalization of
other narcotics may allow police to keep employing narcotics interdiction
between single-family home ownership and ownership in a multiunit dwelling. Thus, the area
sniffed in Edstrom would traditionally not be classified as curtilage. That said, when one analyzes
the demographics of those who live in multiunit dwellings versus those who live in single-family
homes, which receive curtilage protection, the practical effects of this curtilage distinction become
larger. See Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 528 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Kono, 152 A.3d
1, 26 (Conn. 2016)) (discussing housing disparities based on race).
183. Radley Balko, 21 More Studies Showing Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/09/more-
studies-showing-racial-disparities-criminal-justice-system.
184. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
185. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
186. Minnesota’s drug laws present an illuminating example of a conscious legislative shift to
lessen the focus on criminalizing and punishing certain narcotics possession and sale crimes. See
2016 Minn. Laws 2–6 (known as the Drug Sentencing Reform Act or “DSRA”). For example, the
DSRA increased the weight threshold necessary for first- and second-degree methamphetamine
possession from twenty-five to fifty grams and six to twenty-five grams respectively. Id. Minne-
sota’s drug mandatory minimums also changed under the DSRA, shifting from prior convictions
to the presence of aggravating factors, including firearms possession or the substance’s weight. Id.
(although prior convictions can still serve as an aggravating factor).
187. Minnesota case law has noted that narcotics activity has an inherent connection to vio-
lence. State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 2014); State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 797
(Minn. 2013); see also United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Be-
cause weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions, it is reasonable for
an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous . . . when the person is suspected of
being involved in a drug transaction.”).
188. See Legality of Cannabis by U.S. Jurisdiction, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Legality_of_cannabis_by_U.S._jurisdiction (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). Additionally, a majority
of American citizens support legalizing marijuana. Hannah Hartig & A.W. Geiger, About Six-in-
Ten Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization.
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tactics. In turn, warrantless dog sniffs, like the one at issue in Edstrom, may
become commonplace for apartment and condominium dwellers.
On a separate note, both sides in Edstrom debated the value and mean-
ing of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hopkins. Justice Lillehaug’s own
reliance on Hopkins seems misplaced. The Eighth Circuit did distinguish
Hopkins from precedents based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Jardines. Yet the Hopkins court noted another distinction in the case, stat-
ing “In our case, however, there is no ‘common hallway’ which all re-
sidents or guests must use to reach their units. Hopkins’[s] door faced
outside, and the walkway leading up to it was ‘common’ only to Hopkins
and his immediate neighbor.”189 In fact, Hopkins likely does not say what
either side in the Edstrom decision cited it for, as the Eighth Circuit noted in
a footnote: “In this case we need not consider how Jardines applies to inte-
rior hallways of an apartment complex.”190 Hopkins does hold that a dog
sniff six to eight inches outside the door of a townhouse is improper under
Jardines when the walkway outside this residence is not “common.” But its
applicability to Edstrom’s appellate issue is somewhat dubious because the
property management in Edstrom’s apartment building allowed police to
enter the building through the Knox Box.
B. Future Implications
Edstrom can certainly be read as a continued endorsement of police’s
use of narcotics-detection dogs. Even so, narcotics-detection dogs are far
from perfect.191 The presence of the Knox Box, rather the precision or lack
thereof of a dog sniff, may well have determined the outcome of Edstrom
because it is a valid means for law enforcement to enter an otherwise secure
189. United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016).
190. Id. at 732 n.3 (citation omitted). In contrast, this was directly at issue in Edstrom’s case.
191. Whatever one thinks about the utility of this police practice, it is hard to describe it as
“fool-proof.” See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”). In his dissent, Justice Souter collected
many cases which discussed the varying degrees of police dog reliability. Id. at 412 (citing United
States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing a dog that had a 71% accu-
racy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing a
dog that erroneously alerted four times out of nineteen while working for the postal service and 8
percent of the time over its entire career); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir.
2001) (accepting as reliable a dog that gave false positives between 7 percent and 38 percent of
the time); Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001) (discussing a dog that made between
ten and fifty errors)); see also Radley Balko, The Supreme Court’s ‘Alternative Facts’ About
Drug-Sniffing Dogs, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/02/05/supreme-courts-alternative-facts-about-drug-sniffing-dogs (criticizing current prece-
dent for its failure to account for the unreliability of dog sniffs).
These figures suggest that dog sniffs may not be “sui generis.” But the Minnesota Supreme
Court has chosen a case by case approach when assessing the reliability of a dog sniff. See State v.
Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 179 n.11 (Minn. 2007) (citing Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728
N.W.2d 510, 529 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that Minnesota courts use a case by case analysis for
the reliability of narcotics dogs)).
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building.192 Put differently, “but for” the Knox Box, which the building’s
management installed, police could not have lawfully been in the common
hallway, absent an emergency. Perhaps a Knox Box is something tenants
will have to account for when making future living decisions, at least those
tenants who have the luxury of choosing where they live. Alternatively,
landlords may consciously choose to install similar devices to ensure police
can access their buildings to combat drug activities. Either way, whether
law enforcement personnel can lawfully access a multiunit building in non-
emergency situations should be something that tenants are aware of.
Predicting the future in dog sniff jurisprudence is best labeled as a
“guessing game.” The United States Supreme Court’s current composition
seems unlikely to offer hope for those in opposition to the Edstrom deci-
sion.193 The more tenable route to overturning Edstrom would be through
the Minnesota Supreme Court, which is mostly liberal.194 That said, the
chance of the court taking a case with a similar issue is minimal absent
presentation of distinct issues or a major shift in settled law.195
It is equally difficult to hypothesize where this subpart of criminal law
will go. In Minnesota, support for the legalization of recreational marijuana
has grown annually at the state legislature.196 A noteworthy example high-
lighting the shifting tide of our society’s viewpoint of drugs comes from the
192. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013).
193. Chief Justice Roberts’s vote in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (hold-
ing that the government’s acquisition of cell-site information is a search requiring a warrant or
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement), may signal a willingness to side with
the liberal bloc on certain Fourth Amendment issues. While Carpenter differs significantly on a
factual level from Edstrom, bedrock principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence were relevant
to the Chief Justice’s analysis. But Chief Justice Roberts was a dissenter in Jardines, making his
vote in a case reaching the opposite decision of Edstrom doubtful. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at
passim. Additionally, Justice Breyer, a member of the Court’s liberal bloc, dissented in Jardines.
See id.
Lastly, Justice Gorsuch may be a focus for those who support extending Jardines to apart-
ment owners. Justice Gorsuch shares a strikingly similar ideology and analytical methodology
with the late Justice Scalia, the author of Jardines. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Justice
Gorsuch Fulfills Expectations from the Right and the Left, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), http:/
/www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-justice-gorsuch-fulfills-expectations-from-right-
and-left; David Oscar Markus, Justice Gorsuch Channels his Inner-Scalia, and that’s Good for
Criminal Defendants, THE HILL (June 27, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/
450600-justice-gorsuch-channels-his-inner-scalia-good-for-criminal-defendants.
194. For instance, Governor Mark Dayton, a Democrat, appointed Justices Lillehaug, Hudson,
Chutich, McKeig, and Thissen. See Supreme Court Justices, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www
.mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (listing biographical details, in-
cluding appointment information, for the seven Minnesota Supreme Court Justices).
195. This is not to say that Edstrom will be good law for all eternity. Rather, as briefly noted
in this section, the changing public sentiment toward recreational drug use may require reexami-
nation of this decision. Perhaps the fact that Edstrom involved methamphetamine instead of mari-
juana renders the case less favorable for garnering sympathy.
196. In addition, current Governor Tim Walz supports the legalization of recreational mari-
juana in Minnesota. Ryan Faircloth, Legalize Pot? Gov.-elect Tim Walz says Minnesota Should,
PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.twincities.com/2018/11/25/legalize-pot-gov-elect-
tim-walz-says-minnesota-should.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 29 16-APR-20 15:44
2020] STATE v. EDSTROM: NO WARRANT NEEDED 325
Hennepin County Attorney’s Office. Michael O. Freeman—the longtime
chief prosecutor in Hennepin County—has implemented a policy that
places less emphasis on marijuana possession or sale crimes that involve
less than one hundred grams of marijuana.197 This deemphasis on criminal-
izing marijuana possession and sale may create rippling effects on police
practices that specifically aim to combat narcotics activity. If this holds
true, perhaps Edstrom will not have the sweeping impacts noted above.
C. Application of Edstrom
Lastly, based on the relative recency of the Edstrom decision, it re-
mains unclear how Minnesota courts will apply the supreme court’s analy-
sis to future dog-sniff appellate challenges. Recently, the court of appeals
analyzed the Edstrom decision in State v. Vagle, which involved a dog sniff
in an apartment building.198 A confidential informant told police that Vagle
was selling methamphetamine out of an apartment in Edina.199 A police
investigator corroborated the informant’s tip in several ways, including: (1)
showing the informant a picture of Vagle and receiving the informant’s
confirmation that the pictured individual was the person the informant knew
to be selling methamphetamine; (2) observing a vehicle registered to Vagle
parked at the apartment building’s underground garage; (3) seeing Vagle’s
name on the apartment building’s rear-entrance directory; (4) speaking with
the apartment manager, who relayed that Vagle had lived in a different unit
within the building and that police had conducted a dog sniff at this prior
unit; and (5) receiving information from the Drug Enforcement Agency that
one of the agency’s confidential informants had also reported that Brandon
Scott Vagle was selling methamphetamine out of an Edina apartment.200
The apartment manager gave permission for police to enter the build-
ing to conduct a dog sniff and provided an access code to the investigating
officer.201 Officers conducted a dog sniff in the common hallway outside
Vagle’s apartment door, and the narcotics-detection dog alerted to
197. David Chanen, Hennepin County Prosecutor Won’t Charge People Caught with Small
Amounts of Marijuana, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 15, 2019), http://www.startribune.com/hennepin-
county-attorney-won-t-prosecute-people-caught-with-small-amounts-of-marijuana/507174002.
This policy does include certain exceptions, for instance when a firearm is in close proximity, a
person’s case will not automatically go to diversion. See id. In comparison, it is a felony under
Minnesota law to possess more than a small amount of marijuana. MINN. STAT. § 152.025, subd. 2
(2018) (defining a fifth-degree controlled substance possession crime). A “small amount” of mari-
juana is defined as 42.5 grams or less. MINN. STAT. § 152.01, subd. 16 (2018).
198. State v. Vagle, No. A18-0878, 2019 WL 1758004 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2019). Un-
published cases from the Minnesota Court of Appeals are nonprecedential. MINN. STAT.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
199. Vagle, 2019 WL 1758004, at *1.
200. The parties did not dispute the facts on appeal. Id.
201. Id.
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methamphetamine.202 Upon receipt of a search warrant, officers executed it
the next day at Vagle’s apartment, where they recovered drugs, drug para-
phernalia, and cash.203 On appeal, Vagle challenged the constitutionality of
the dog sniff outside his apartment and argued that without the sniff, the
search warrant for his apartment lacked the requisite probable cause.204
Vagle argued that Edstrom was wrongly decided and that Minnesota courts
should follow the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jardines.205
Noting that “[t]he court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent,”
the Vagle court held that the dog sniff in the apartment hallway was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.206
The court of appeals then examined the dog sniff’s propriety under the
Minnesota Constitution and “consider[ed] whether the police were lawfully
present in the hallway outside Vagle’s apartment and whether they had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”207 While Vagle dis-
puted the informant’s reliability, the court of appeals analogized the inform-
ant’s tip, and law enforcement’s later corroboration, to the facts in Edstrom
and held that it supplied reasonable, articulable suspicion that Vagle was
engaged in narcotics activity.208 From there, the court of appeals held that
the tip, its corroboration, and the positive alert from the narcotics-detection
dog were sufficient to support a probable cause finding for the search war-
rant’s issuance.209
Vagle makes two things clear: (1) Minnesota courts are unwilling to
find that apartment residents possess Fourth Amendment rights in their hall-
ways; and (2) The analysis of whether a dog sniff is permissible under the
Minnesota Constitution continues to turn on the amount of reasonable sus-
picion that law enforcement possesses before conducting the sniff. Vagle
shows that the only tenable route of overruling Edstrom is through the Min-
nesota Supreme Court or above. In essence, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
202. Id. at *2. During the dog sniff, police also swabbed the door handle to Vagle’s apartment
using IonScan technology, which revealed methamphetamine. Id. After describing the mechanics
of IonScan technology, the court of appeals ultimately did not reach this issue of whether the use
of this technology constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *2 n.4, *7 (citing
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2017)).
203. Id.
204. Vagle, 2019 WL 1758004, at *3.
205. Id. (citing State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.
1 (2013)).
206. Vagle, 2019 WL 1758004, at *3 (citing State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 342 (Minn.
2018)). The court of appeals noted that the Edstrom court’s distinction of Jardines: “The area
immediately adjacent to Edstrom’s apartment door is not analogous to the front porch in Jardines
because it is located in an internal, common hallway that other tenants and the police jointly use
and access with Edstrom. Jardines, therefore, does not control the curtilage question presented in
this case.” Id. (quoting State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 520 (Minn. 2018)).
207. Id. (citing State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. 2018)).
208. Id. at *5–6 (citing State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 2018)).
209. Id. at *6–7.
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peals will not overrule higher court precedent, despite any contrary
insistence that Edstrom was “wrongly decided.”210
CONCLUSION
While certainly not radical, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision
in State v. Edstrom appears outdated when contextualized with our modern
society. The luxury of owning a home is not something all Americans en-
joy.211 Additionally, the changing public sentiment about narcotics use—at
least as it pertains to marijuana—serves as a basis to question the utility and
practicality of the police practices employed in Edstrom.212 As these two
principles continue to play out, the reexamination of Edstrom and other dog
sniff precedents in Minnesota may become necessary.
210. See generally Vagle, 2019 WL 1758004, at *3
211. For instance, nearly thirty percent of Minnesotans resided in a rental living space (home
or apartment) in 2018. Gabrielle Norton, Out of Reach Minnesota 2018, MINN. HOUSING PART-
NERSHIP, https://www.mhponline.org/publications/out-of-reach/2018 (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
212. Hartig & Geiger, supra note 189.
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